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Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits by Jeffrie G. Murphy. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003. Pp. ix + 138. Cloth $22.95; Paper $16.95.
PAUL reASONer, bethel University
One approaches the task of reviewing Getting Even by Jeffrie Murphy with 
some trepidation. With a title like that, what if Prof. Murphy does not 
like the review and decides to get even? These worries are not entirely 
misplaced, since he states, “Speaking (as almost any Irishman can) from 
extensive personal experience as a rather vindictive person, I believe that 
I have often gotten even with people by actions that were moderate and 
proportional” (p. 24). But I will risk the review since this is a splendid 
book in which Murphy offers a defense of vindictive passions and a plea 
for a “cautious and critical commitment to forgiveness” (p. 38). From the 
title of the book, Getting Even: Forgiveness and Its Limits, one might think 
that he is simply offering a defense of vindictiveness and praise for getting 
even, but the overall tone of the book is more balanced—indeed, Mur-
phy is careful to say that he is only offering two cheers (not three) for 
vindictiveness (p. 26), and his study of vindictive passions leads us into 
a deepened understanding of forgiveness. Murphy has published many 
pieces on forgiveness (including Forgiveness and Mercy, co-authored with 
Jean Hampton) and here he continues some of his previous themes and 
examines new ones as well. A strong bibliography, with some of the en-
tries grouped topically, will also serve readers well.
Getting Even is framed in terms of the question of how we should re-
spond to evil. Much of the book, as indicated in the title, is concerned 
with two possible responses to evil—vindictiveness and forgiveness—and 
their proper place and balance. While framing the response to evil in this 
way suggests that one is either entertaining vindictive passions or forgiv-
ing, Murphy recognizes responses to evil between those two options, for 
example simply being hurt or disappointed by wrong done to one (p. 3). 
things that exist by the occurrence of modes, and Leftow applies this to 
the Persons of the Trinity, which are understood to be event-based in such 
a way that they are founded upon a substance (p. 374). Leftow thinks that 
the Trinity “arises” because God lives His life in three streams of events at 
once. Each stream is the life of a person, and each person exists as the oc-
currence of a Lockean mode. In order to make this claim plausible, Leftow 
appeals to temporary identity theories, and so is committed to a contin-
gent identity thesis.
Overall, Persons: Human and Divine is a great anthology. The editors did 
a terrific job of drawing together numerous themes with far-reaching im-
plications for ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of action, philo-
sophical theology, and of course philosophy of mind. 
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However, his concern initially is to see to what extent vindictive passions 
can be defended and to ascertain the role they may play in our individual 
moral lives and in the moral life of a community. His entry point is the 
matter of holding vindictive feelings and the question of how quickly 
someone ought to forgive a wrong, and indeed if forgiveness is always 
appropriate. After defending the rationality and moral legitimacy of hold-
ing vindictive feelings (at least as a possibility for a time), he moves to the 
virtue of forgiveness. Murphy defines forgiveness as the putting away of 
resentful feelings (an internal change in the one who has been wronged). 
He focuses on interpersonal forgiveness and self-forgiveness but chooses 
not to give an extended discussion of corporate forgiveness (although the 
topic comes up occasionally, e.g., with references to the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission).
Chapter five on “Repentance, Punishment, and Mercy” is particularly 
strong, and chapter six on “Self-Forgiveness” raises issues as to the co-
herence of self-resentment and the nature of moral hatred of oneself (fol-
lowing Jean Hampton). In this context, Murphy enriches his definition of 
forgiveness beyond the overcoming of inner feelings of vindictiveness/re-
sentment and now includes feelings of “anger, hatred, loathing, contempt, 
indifference, disappointment, or even sadness” (p. 59). In chapter seven 
(“Forgiveness in Psychotherapy”) he advances the conversation about the 
role of forgiveness in psychological counseling (sometimes termed “philo-
sophical counseling”) by raising significant concerns about developments 
in this growing field. One can see this chapter as an applied version of 
some of Murphy’s concerns expressed earlier in the book about “hasty” 
forgiveness (see the discussion of “hasty” forgiveness below). And he 
raises some hard questions about self-forgiveness with the comment “we 
might wonder if certain persons—by their horrible acts—have not for-
feited forever their right to be ‘comfortable’ with themselves [a goal of 
therapy in forgiveness counseling]” (p. 84). He offers an extended analysis 
of the question of capital punishment (chapter nine) and its consistency 
with the Christian doctrine of love and the command to forgive (chapter 
eight). While his discussion is explicitly about forgiveness and Christian-
ity in these chapters, in most of the text, and even in chapters 8 and 9, his 
discussion will be of interest to an audience broader than those who claim 
Christian faith.
I now focus on three of the many issues which Murphy presents in 
this excellent book: (1) Murphy’s attack on “hasty forgiveness,” (2) his 
position on repentance as generally a proper condition for forgiveness, 
and (3) the use of terms such as “getting even” and “vindictive feelings.”
The book targets a “hasty forgiveness” (p. 16) and a “thoughtless and 
sentimental commitment [to forgiveness]” (p. 38). One initially gets the 
impression that Murphy would be pleased if when we are wronged we 
first allow the feelings of resentment to build and even ferment a bit, tak-
ing clear stock of how we have been wronged, and then only slowly and 
carefully move to a consideration of whether or not we are willing to 
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forgive the perpetrator of the wrong we have received. Furthermore, all 
such cases might not need to end in forgiveness and that would be just 
fine morally. What exactly is the target Murphy has in his sights? It is 
“hasty” (p. 16), “premature” (p. 80), and “quick” (p. 80) forgiveness. Is 
there much of this type of forgiveness going around these days? Murphy 
correctly notes the growth in the “forgiveness” industry—texts, self-help 
books, and even claims for the physical benefits of forgiveness—and sug-
gests that there is too much of this cheap forgiveness these days (one 
could also note that there is not enough forgiveness in another sense 
since longstanding grudges also seem prevalent). But I believe his use of 
“hasty” (his preferred adjective for the type of forgiveness he is targeting) 
is only on the surface tied to forgiveness in temporal terms. This becomes 
clear when Murphy discusses what is wrong with “hasty” forgiveness. 
“Hasty” forgiveness is bad for at least three reasons: it does not preserve 
one’s self-respect by taking seriously that one has been demeaned by the 
wrongdoer and therefore diminished by the wrong; it leaves one vul-
nerable to further attacks by wrongdoers; and it does not preserve the 
moral integrity of a society (p. 19). These are genuine concerns. Murphy 
is concerned that emphasis on “quick” forgiveness (or, closely related, 
the Christian analogue of a required giving of unconditional forgiveness) 
will result in a servile personality and the breakdown of proper moral re-
sponsibility in society. I believe Murphy’s real target is a claimed forgive-
ness which fails to take seriously the wrong that has been done and the 
damage it has inflicted to both self and community. One suspects that one 
could equally label the target as “pseudo-forgiveness” instead of “hasty” 
forgiveness. Proffered forgiveness which does not take the wrong done 
seriously is not really forgiveness (“hasty” or otherwise) because there is 
nothing to forgive.
To make sure that the forgiveness is not “hasty,” i.e., that the forgive-
ness is genuine (on my reading), Murphy focuses on the place of vindic-
tive passions (this is his way of taking the wrong done seriously; there 
might be other ways of taking the wrong done seriously without possess-
ing vindictive passions). And he is quite right that when one believes one 
has been wronged, and feels vindictive passions, the possibility of offering 
forgiveness is surely in play and that forgiveness would be genuine (i.e., 
non-“hasty”). Murphy also builds his definition of forgiveness (following 
the insights of Bishop Butler) on the overcoming of vindictive passions and 
feelings of resentment; forgiveness “involves a change in inner feeling more 
than a change in external action” (p. 13). Murphy mentions that “hasty” 
forgiveness (this change of inner feelings) might be associated with two 
types of persons—saints or servile personalities (those lacking proper self-
respect)—and he focuses on the latter (something we don’t want to be or 
become) and so is concerned with the proper place for vindictive passions.
But consider briefly some thoughts on saints. “Hasty” (or “quick” or I 
might think of “prompt”) forgiveness may be in fact genuine forgiveness 
on the part of a saint. While saints are often acutely aware of their own sin-
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fulness (and may experience vindictive passions), they are also character-
ized as those who (at times) do not internally feel the harm intended by the 
wrongdoer and are thus able to forgive quickly and naturally. Their moral 
character has developed to such a stage. Does this make them servile? I 
think not, since, as Murphy notes elsewhere (p. 78), someone’s standing 
may be unshaken by the attack of the wrongdoer because they may find 
their deepest self-identity in a religious perspective of reality, or see them-
selves as God’s children. Does the moral order of society break down if 
saints “quickly” forgive? Perhaps it may, but history also seems to suggest 
that saints function as a moral compass for society engendering reform 
among wrongdoers. It appears that we have, then, one type of “hasty” 
forgiveness which is genuine forgiveness and which perhaps also serves 
as a counter-example to forgiveness which requires a change in inner feel-
ings. Saints may at least in some cases not experience the vindictive pas-
sions and yet their forgiveness toward wrongdoers certainly recognizes 
that wrong was done or attempted. On Murphy’s original model, either 
the saints do not forgive (since they have no change in internal vindictive 
passions), or their claimed offering of forgiveness must be accounted for 
in some other way. One could respond to this counterexample, of course, 
and preserve the role of vindictive passions and forgiveness as change in 
internal feelings by considering that saints are a special class of persons 
who have grown in the handling of vindictive passions and the exercise of 
forgiveness such that the individual cases of having to deal with vindic-
tive passions and the question of forgiveness have now become general-
ized into character patterns. What the rest of us seek to accomplish (to 
forgive) by taking time and effort in individual instances of wrongdoing, 
comes effortlessly to saints.
A second theme of interest is the relationship between repentance and 
forgiveness. Murphy offers as almost a mantra the claim that without 
repentance there is no forgiveness (even though he accepts the powerful 
results from some instances of forgiveness which precede repentance). 
The “saintly” forgiveness I have discussed above may fall into this excep-
tion category for Murphy. Murphy is surely right that paradigm cases of 
forgiveness have a genuine movement of repentance on the part of the 
wrongdoer and a genuine overcoming of vindictive passions on the part 
of the one wronged and may even include some type of (external) rec-
onciliation between the parties. Why is he concerned about forgiveness 
being offered without, or prior to, repentance? Among other concerns, 
he wants to avoid the sense that the prior forgiveness might have coer-
cive force on the one who has yet to repent. This is a significant concern, 
particularly in cases when the forgiver offers forgiveness and then seems 
to expect or even demand that the corresponding movement of repen-
tance be given by the wrongdoer. But this worry can also be couched 
in terms of whether the forgiveness offered is only pseudo-forgiveness 
rather than genuine forgiveness (seen earlier with the issue of “hasty” 
forgiveness). One could argue that preemptive “coercive” forgiveness of 
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the type described is not genuine forgiveness since one’s inner vindic-
tive passions have only contingently altered, i.e., this “coercive” forgive-
ness may be seen as only “potential” forgiveness—“I’ll alter my vindic-
tive passions toward you as soon as you repent.” But perhaps this is not 
genuine forgiveness.
Just as Murphy wants to steer clear of a “hasty” or “shallow” forgive-
ness, he also pushes us to think seriously about what constitutes repen-
tance. Consider this insight, offered in the context of when mercy or 
pardon ought to be granted: “A truly repentant person, however, would 
normally see his suffering punishment as proper and might … even seek it 
out” (Murphy’s emphasis, pp. 51–52). I see his emphasis on holding on to 
vindictive passions (being aware of them, tasting the depth of the wrong 
one has received) in symmetrical balance with his emphasis on what true 
repentance really is (awareness of the pain one has inflicted and the appro-
priateness of suffering and punishment as a result). Thus, the emphasis on 
awareness of the significance of vindictive passions is equally balanced in 
his account by an awareness of the depth of genuine repentance.
Finally, consider Murphy’s use of the terms “getting even” and “vin-
dictive feelings.” While Murphy admits that a range of responses not lim-
ited to vindictive passions are possible when one is wronged (disappoint-
ment, sadness, etc.), this work is focused on the vindictive passions. The 
phrase which is the title of book, Getting Even, and terms like “vindictive 
passions” seem to be used to stand in for a wider array of inner states. For 
example, can “anger” be separated off from the “desire to get even” or 
“vengeance”? I think so. Hence, it is curious that the cover of the book is 
from El Greco’s Christ Driving the Money Changers from the Temple. It seems 
odd to say that Christ is “getting even” with the money changers and the 
sellers of sacrificial animals in the temple. Is Christ angry with them and 
using violence against them? Yes. But is he exacting vengeance against 
them? Is he “getting even”? I am not so sure. Perhaps my intuitions have 
been too heavily influenced by common descriptions of the passage in the 
gospel of John which speak of Christ “cleansing” the temple. Purificatory 
actions which put the world right need not be vengeful or instances of 
“getting even.” And yet, some of the power of Murphy’s treatment of the 
subject of vindictive passions is precisely that he attempts to free terms 
like “getting even” and “vindictive passions” from the pejorative over-
tones which seem to be part of our (or at least my) intuitions.
This brings us back to the purpose of the book: “To render at least plau-
sible my belief that vindictiveness and vengeance possess some positive 
value, to defend forgiveness in such a way as not utterly to deny that val-
ue, [and] to explore how repentance opens the door for legitimate forgive-
ness” (p. 95). Murphy has certainly made a strong case that attention given 
to vindictive passions will help one recognize cases of genuine forgive-
ness. What began as a book defending (to a point) vindictive passions can 
be seen as developing into a defense of a robust notion of forgiveness.
